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Summary  The  design  of  ID-based  cryptography  has  received  much  attention  from  researchers.
However, how  to  revoke  the  misbehaviour/compromised  user  in  ID-based  public  key  cryptosys-
tem becomes  an  important  research  issue.  Recently,  Tseng  and  Tsai  proposed  a  novel  public  key
cryptosystem  called  revocable  ID-based  public  key  cryptosystem  (RIBE)  to  solve  the  revocationBilinear  pairings problem.  Later  on,  numerous  research  papers  based  on  the  Tseng-Tsai  key  RIBE  were  proposed.
In this  paper,  we  brief  review  Tseng  and  Tsai’s  RIBE.  We  hope  this  review  can  help  the  readers
to understand  the  Tseng  and  Tsai’s  revocable  ID-based  public  key  cryptosystem.




IntroductionIn  the  traditional  public  key  cryptosystems  (Difﬁe  and
Hellman,  1976;  ElGamal,  1985;  Rivest  et  al.,  1978),  certiﬁ-
cates  play  important  roles  to  make  publicly  available  the
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apping  between  identities  and  public  keys.  Certiﬁcate  is  a
ignature  generated  by  a  trusted  certiﬁcate  authority  (CA)
hich  usually  include  the  identity  of  a  user,  its  associated
ublic  key,  the  issuing  date  and  the  expiration  date.  When
ser’s  public  key  is  used,  the  associated  certiﬁcate  must  be
hecked  to  ensure  its  validity  (revoked  or  non-revoked).  In
eneral,  Certiﬁcate  Revocation  List  (CRL)  (Housley  et  al.,
002) is  used  to  revoke  the  user’s  public  key.  Anyone  can
heck  these  revoked  users’  public  keys  by  querying  the
RL.
In  order  to  solve  the  management  of  users’  certiﬁcates,
hamir  (1984)  ﬁrst  proposed  the  concept  of  ID-based  pub-
ic  key  cryptosystem  (ID-PKS).  In  his  system,  each  user’s



































































































dentity  (e.g.  e-mail  address  or  social  security  number)  can
e  viewed  as  public  key  and  the  user’s  private  key  is  gen-
rated  by  a  trusted  private  key  generation  center  (PKG).
owever,  Shamir’  ID-PKS  was  not  easy  in  practice  because
he  underlying  mathematical  methods  are  not  suitable.  In
001,  Boneh  and  Franklin,  (2001)  followed  Shamir’s  con-
ept  to  propose  a  practical  ID-based  encryption  scheme  (IBE)
rom  the  Weil  pairing.  Later  on,  the  design  of  ID-based  cryp-
ographic  schemes  and  protocols  using  bilinear  pairings  has
eceived  much  attention  from  researchers.
For  the  revocation  problem  in  the  ID-PKS  system,  Boneh
nd  Franklin,  (2001)  have  suggested  a  solution  in  which  the
KG  can  periodically  renew  the  private  keys  for  non-revoked
sers.  In  other  words,  when  the  PKG  wants  to  revoke  a
peciﬁc  user,  it  only  stops  to  issue  the  new  private  key.  How-
ver,  this  solution  has  following  drawbacks:  (1)  the  workload
f  generating  new  private  keys  of  non-revoked  users  is  too
eavy  for  the  PKG;  (2)  secure  channels  are  needed  between
he  PKG  and  the  non-revoked  users  to  transmit  the  new
rivate  keys  for  each  time  period.
Boldyreva  et  al.  (2008)  proposed  a  revocable  ID-based
ncryption  scheme  (RIBE)  by  using  binary  tree  to  reduce  the
KG’s  workload  in  the  Boneh—Franklin  IBE.  Unfortunately,
heir  scheme  is  based  on  the  relaxed  selective-ID  model
Canetti  et  al.,  2003),  a  weak  security  model.  In  the  next
ear,  Libert  and  Vergnaud  (2009)  based  on  the  Boldyreva
t  al.’s  RIBE  to  propose  a  more  secure  RIBE  scheme  under  an
daptive-ID  model,  a  strong  security  model.  Seo  and  Emura
2013a)  demonstrated  Boldyreva  et  al.’s  RIBE  (Boldyreva
t  al.,  2008)  is  vulnerable  to  the  decryption  key  exposure.
hey  also  proposed  a  provably  secure  tree-based  revocable
D-based  encryption  scheme.  Subsequently,  Seo  and  Emura
2013b)  presented  a  hierarchical  revocable  ID-based  encryp-
ion  scheme  which  solved  the  open  problem  mentioned  in
he  Libert—Vergnaud  RIBE.
Tseng  and  Tsai  (2012)  proposed  a  practical  RIBE  scheme
ver  a  public  channel.  The  key  construction  their  scheme
s  different  from  the  previous  schemes  (Boldyreva  et  al.,
008;  Libert  and  Vergnaud,  2009;  Seo  and  Emura,  2013a,b).
n  the  Tseng-Tsai  RIBE,  each  user’s  private  key  consists  of
 ﬁxed  initial  private  key  and  an  updating  time  key,  where
he  updating  time  key  is  renewed  along  with  the  current
eriod.  For  an  honest  (non-revoked)  user,  the  PKG  peri-
dically  issues  new  time  key  and  sends  it  to  the  user  via
 public  channel.  Upon  receiving  the  new  time  key,  the
ser  can  renew  her/his  private  key  by  herself/himself.
o  revoke  a  malicious/misbehaviour  user,  the  PKG  only
tops  issuing  the  new  time  key  in  current  period.  In  other
ords,  the  malicious/misbehaviour  user  cannot  compute  the
ewest  private.  She/he  cannot  execute  any  cryptographic
ehaviours  in  later  periods.  Later  on,  several  revocable  ID-
ased  cryptographic  schemes  and  protocols  based  on  the  key
onstruction  of  the  Tseng-Tsai  RIBE  were  proposed  such  as
ncryption  (Tsai  et  al.,  2012,  2014),  signature  (Hung  et  al.,
014;  Tsai  et  al.,  2013;  Wu  et  al.,  2012a),  signcryption  (Wu
t  al.,  2012b),  and  authenticated  group  key  exchange  (Wu
t  al.,  2012,  2014).
In  this  paper,  we  brief  review  Tseng  and  Tsai’s  RIBEcheme  which  contains  the  underlying  mathematical  prob-
ems  and  assumptions,  the  framework  of  RIBE,  a  concrete
IBE  scheme,  the  security  notion  of  RIBE,  the  security  anal-
sis  of  RIBE  (sketched),  and  a  full  RIBE  scheme.  We  hope
T
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his  review  can  help  the  readers  to  understand  the  Tseng
nd  Tsai’s  revocable  ID-based  public  key  cryptosystem.
nderlying mathematical problems and
ssumptions
ilinear  pairings
ilinear  pairings  deﬁned  on  elliptic  curves  over  ﬁnite  ﬁelds
ave  been  used  to  establish  many  ID-based  cryptographic
echanisms.  Let  G1 be  an  additive  cyclic  group  of  large
rime  order  q  and  G2 be  a multiplicative  cyclic  group  of  the
ame  order  q.  Speciﬁcally,  particular,  G1 is  a  subgroup  of  the
roup  of  points  on  an  elliptic  curve  over  a  ﬁnite  ﬁeld  and  G2
s  a subgroup  of  the  multiplicative  group  over  a  ﬁnite  ﬁeld.
 bilinear  pairing  is  a  map  e:  G1 ×  G1 →  G2 and  satisﬁes  the
ollowing  three  properties:
1)  Bilinear.  e(aP,  bQ)  =  e(P,  Q)ab, for  all  P,  Q  ∈  G1 and
a,  b  ∈  Z∗q.
2)  Non-degenerate.  There  exist  P,  Q  ∈  G1 such  that  e(P,
Q)  /=  1.
3)  Computable.  For  all  P,  Q  ∈  G1,  there  is  an  efﬁcient  algo-
rithm  to  compute  e(P,  Q).
A  bilinear  map  that  satisﬁes  the  above  three  properties
s  called  an  admissible  bilinear  map.  Such  non-degenerate
dmissible  bilinear  maps  can  be  obtained  from  the  Weil,
ate,  or  Ate  pairings  over  supersingular  elliptic  curves  or
belian  varieties  (Boneh  and  Franklin,  2001;  Chen  et  al.,
007).  Some  research  results  (Galbraith  et  al.,  2008;  Wu
nd  Tseng,  2010)  for  the  relationship  between  security  lev-
ls  and  speed  of  pairing  computations  on  microprocessors
ere  presented.
ilinear  Difﬁe—Hellman  (BDH)  assumption
he  BDH  assumption  is  often  used  in  the  security  proof  of
D-based  encryption  scheme.  The  BDH  problem  is  described
s  follows.  Given  P,  aP,  bP,  cP  ∈  G1 for  some  a,  b,  c  ∈  Z∗q,
his  problem  is  to  compute  the  value  e(P,  P)abc ∈  G2.  The
DH  assumption  is  stated  as  follows.
eﬁnition  1  (BDH  assumption). Given  an  additive  cyclic
roup  G1 and  P,  aP,  bP,  cP  ∈  G1 for  unknown  a,  b,  c  ∈  Z∗q,
o  probabilistic  polynomial  time  (PPT)  algorithm  A  with  non-
egligible  probability  which  can  compute  e(P,  P)abc ∈  G2.
he  successful  probability  (advantage)  of  A  is  presented  as
dvA =  Pr[P  ∈  G1,  a,  b,  c  ∈  Z∗q |A(P,  aP,  bP,  cP)
=  e(P,  P)abc  ∈  G2],
here  the  probability  is  over  the  random  choice  consumed
y  A.
ramework of the Tseng-Tsai RIBEhe  Tseng-Tsai  RIBE  consists  of  two  roles:  a  trusted  PKG  and
sers.  Without  loss  of  generality,  the  whole  lifetime  of  the
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simplicity,  these  time  periods  may  be  viewed  as  1  day,  1
week,  or  1  month.  The  PKG  selects  a  master  secret  key  and
generates  public  parameters.  For  a  given  user’s  identity  ID,
the  PKG  computes  his/her  associated  initial  private  key  and
sends  it  to  the  user  via  a  secure  channel.  At  the  beginning
of  each  time  period,  the  PKG  uses  the  master  secret  key  to
generate  a  time  updating  key  for  each  non-revoked  user’s
identity  ID  and  then  sends  them  to  users  via  a  public  channel.
For  a  revoked  user,  it  is  unable  to  receive  the  associated  time
updating  key  in  the  current  time  period.
Remark  1.  For  a  RIBE,  the  point  is  that  any  sender  can
encrypt  a  message  to  some  identity  ID  without  concerning
with  the  key  updating  process.  In  a  RIBE,  encrypting  a  mes-
sage  m  to  a  receiver  with  identity  ID  during  time  period  i
that  results  in  a  ciphertext  tuple  (ID,  i,  C).  Upon  receiving
(ID,  i,  C),  a  non-revoked  user  with  the  valid  private  key  can
recover  the  message  m.
A  RIBE  with  a  public  channel  is  a  5-tuple  of  polynomial-
time  algorithms  (G,  IKE,  TKU, E,  D):
(1)  System  setup  algorithm  G  is  a  probabilistic  algorithm
that  takes  as  input  a  security  parameter  1k and  the  total
number  z  of  time  periods.  It  returns  a  master  private  key
and  the  public  parameters  Parms. The  public  parame-
ters  Parms  are  made  public  and  implicitly  inputted  to
all  the  following  algorithms.
(2)  Initial  key  extract  algorithm  IKE  is  a  deterministic  algo-
rithm  that  takes  as  input  the  master  private  key  s  and  a
user’s  identity  ID  ∈  {0,  1}*,  and  then  returns  the  user’s
initial  secret  key  DID.
(3)  Time  key  updating  algorithm  TKU  takes  as  input  the  mas-
ter  private  key  s,  a  user’s  identity  ID  ∈  {0,  1}*  and  a
time  period  i,  and  then  returns  the  user’s  time  update
key  TIDi.
(4)  Encryption  algorithm  E  takes  as  input  a  time  period  i,  a
message  m  and  a  user’s  ID.  Then  it  returns  a  ciphertext
C.
(5)  Decryption  algorithm  D  takes  as  input  a  ciphertext  C  and
an  entire  private  key  DIDi.  Then  it  returns  a  plaintext  m.
Remark  2.  The  user’s  entire  private  key  DIDi for  the  time
period  i is  not  explicitly  provided  for  the  user.  Each  legit-
imate  (non-revoked)  user  may  obtain  the  corresponding
entire  decryption  key  DIDi by  DIDi =  DID  +  TIDi,  where  the
user’s  initial  private  key  DID  is  generated  by  the  initial  key
extract  algorithm  and  the  user’s  time  updating  key  TIDi is
periodically  generated  by  the  PKG  along  with  time.
Concrete basic RIBE scheme
Basic  RIBE  scheme  consists  of  ﬁve  algorithms:  the  system
setup,  the  initial  key  extract,  the  time  key  updating,  the
encryption,  and  the  decryption  algorithms.
(1)  System  setup. Given  a  security  parameter  k  and  the  total
number  z  of  time  periods,  a  trusted  private  key  gener-
ator  (PKG)  generates  two  groups  G1,  G2 of  prime  order
q  >  2k,  an  admissible  bilinear  map  e:  G1 ×  G1 →  G2 and  a
generator  P  of  G1.  The  PKG  randomly  chooses  a  master83
secret  key  s  ∈  Z∗q and  computes  Ppub = s·P  ∈  G1 as  the
system  public  key.  The  PKG  picks  three  hash  functions
H0: {0,  1}*  →  G1,  H1:  {0,  1}*  →  G1, and  H2:  G2 →  {0,  1}n.
The  public  parameters  and  functions  are  presented  as
Parms  = {q,  G1,  G2, e,  P,  Ppub,  H0, H1,  H2}.
2)  Initial  key  extract.  For  a  given  user’s  identity  ID  ∈  {0,
1}*,  the  PKG  computes  QID  =  H1(ID)  and  the  associated
initial  secret  key  DID  =  s·QID  ∈  G1.  Then  DID  is  transmit-
ted  to  the  user  via  a  secure  channel.
3)  Time  key  updating.  Given  a  non-revoked  user’s  identity
ID  and  time  period  i,  the  PKG  computes  RIDi =  H0(ID,  i)
and  the  associated  user’s  time  update  key  TIDi =  s·RIDi ∈
G1 for  time  period  i.  The  PKG  sends  TIDi to  the  user
using  a  public  channel.  Thus,  the  non-revoked  user  can
update  his/her  entire  private  key  DIDi =  DID  +  TIDi for
time  period  i.
4)  Encryption. In  time  period  i,  given  a  message  m  and
a  non-revoked  receiver  with  identity  ID,  a  sender
chooses  a  random  number  r  ∈  Z∗q and  computes
QIDi =  QID  +  RIDi =  H1(ID)  +  H0(ID,  i).  Then,  the  sender
uses  QIDi to  compute  U  =  r·P  and  V  =  m  ⊕  H2(gr),  where
g  =  e(QIDi, Ppub).  The  ciphertext  for  the  message  m  is
C  =  (U,  V).
5)  Decryption. Given  a  ciphertext  C  =  (U,  V),  the  receiver
can  use  his/her  entire  decryption  key  to  compute
V  ⊕  H2(e(DIDi, U))  =  m.
Here,  we  present  the  correctness  of  the  decryption  equa-
ion  as  follows:
V  ⊕  H2(e(DIDi,  U)) = V  ⊕  H2(e(s  · H1(ID)  +  s  · H0(ID,  i),  r  · P))
=  V  ⊕  H2(e(s  · H1(ID)  +  s  · H0(ID,  i),  P)r)
=  V  ⊕  H2(e(H1(ID)  +  H0(ID,  i),  s  ·  P)r)
=  V  ⊕  H2(e(QIDi, Ppub)r).
ecurity analysis of basic RIBE scheme
ecurity  notions
seng  and  Tsai  followed  the  security  requirement  of  IBE
Boneh  and  Franklin,  2001)  to  propose  the  requirements  of
IBE.  A  RIBE  is  semantically  secure  against  an  adaptive  CPA
IND-RID-CPA)  if  no  PPT  adversary  A  has  a  non-negligible
dvantage  against  the  challenger  B  in  the  following  IND-RID-
PA  game:
1)  System  setup.  The  challenger  B  runs  the  System  setup
algorithm.  It  gives  the  adversary  A  the  resulting  public
parameters  Parms  and  B  keeps  the  master  private  key
s.
2)  Phase  1.  The  adversary  A  may  make  a  number  of  differ-
ent  queries  adaptively  to  the  challenger  B  as  follows:
(i)  Initial  key  extract  query  (ID).  Upon  receiving  this
query  with  ID,  the  challenger  B  runs  the  initial  key
extract  algorithm  IKE  to  return  the  user’s  initial
secret  key  DID  to  A.
(ii)  Time  key  updating  query  (ID,  i).  The  challenger  B





























































TKU  to  generate  the  user’s  time  updating  key  TIDi
corresponding  to  the  time  period  i  and  the  identity
ID.  It  returns  TIDi to  A.
3)  Challenge. The  adversary  A  outputs  a  target  plaintext
pair  (M0,  M1)  and  target  identity  (ID*,  i*).  A  restriction
here  is  that  either  ID*  or  (ID*,  i*)  did  not  appear  in  the
initial  key  extract  query  or  the  time  key  updating  query,
respectively.  The  challenger  B  picks  ˇ  ∈  {0,  1}  at  ran-
dom  and  creates  a  target  ciphertext  C*  =  E(ID*,  i*,  Mˇ).
Then  the  challenger  B  returns  C*  to  A.
4)  Phase  2.  The  adversary  A  may  issue  more  queries  as
follows:
(i)  Initial  key  extract  query  (ID)  as  in  Phase  1.
(ii)  Time  key  updating  query  (ID,  i)  as  in  Phase  1.
The  restriction  here  is  that  either  ID*  or  (ID*,  i*)  is
disallowed  to  be  queried  in  the  initial  key  extract  query
or  the  time  key  update  query,  respectively.
5)  Guess. The  adversary  A  outputs  its  guess  ˇ′ ∈  {0,  1}  and
wins  this  game  if  ˇ′ =  ˇ.
We  refer  to  such  an  adversary  A  as  an  IND-RID-CPA  adver-
ary.  We  deﬁne  the  adversary  A’s  advantage  in  attacking  the
IBE  as  the  following  function  of  the  security  parameter  k:
dvA(k)  =  |Pr[ˇ′ =  ˇ]  −  1/2|.
eﬁnition  2.  We  say  that  a  RIBE  is  semantically  secure
gainst  an  adaptive  CPA  if,  for  any  polynomial  time  IND-RID-
PA  adversary  A,  the  function  AdvA(k)  is  negligible.
Then,  a  more  secure  security  model  than  CPA  model  is
ntroduced  called  CCA  model.  We  say  that  a  RIBE  is  seman-
ically  secure  against  an  adaptive  CCA  (IND-RID-CCA)  if  no
PT  adversary  A  has  a  non-negligible  advantage  against  the
hallenger  B  in  the  following  IND-RID-CCA  game:
1)  System  setup.  As  in  the  IND-RID-CPA  game.
2)  Phase  1.  The  adversary  A  may  make  a  number  of  differ-
ent  queries  adaptively  to  the  challenger  B  as  follows:
(i)  Initial  key  extract  query  (ID).  As  in  the  IND-RID-CPA
game.
(ii)  Time  key  updating  query  (ID,  i).  As  in  the  IND-RID-
CPA  game.
(iii)  Decryption  query  (ID,  i,  C).  Upon  receiving  the
query,  the  challenger  B  obtains  an  entire  decryp-
tion  key  associated  with  (ID,  i)  which  is  denoted
by  DIDi.  The  entire  decryption  key  DIDi is  implic-
itly  obtained  by  issuing  the  initial  key  extract  query
(ID)  and  the  time  key  update  query  (ID,  i).  B  runs
the  decryption  algorithm  D  to  decrypt  the  cipher-
text  C  using  this  entire  decryption  key  DIDi.  Then
it  returns  D(DIDi,  C)  to  A.
3)  Challenge. The  adversary  A  outputs  a  target  plaintext
pair  (M0,  M1)  and  target  identity  (ID*,  i*).  A  restriction
here  is  that  either  ID*  or  (ID*,  i*)  did  not  appear  in  the
initial  key  extract  query  or  the  time  key  updating  query,
respectively.  The  challenger  B  picks  ˇ  ∈  {0,  1}  at  ran-
dom  and  creates  a  target  ciphertext  C*  =  E(ID*,  i*,  Mˇ).
Then  the  challenger  B  returns  C*  to  A.4)  Phase  2.  The  adversary  A  may  issue  more  queries  as
follows:
(i)  Initial  key  extract  query  (ID)  as  in  Phase  1.
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(iii)  Decryption  query  (ID,  i,  C).  The  challenger  B
responds  as  in  Phase  1,  where  (ID,  i,  C)  /=  (ID*,  i*,
C*).
The  restriction  here  is  that  either  ID*  or  (ID*,  i*)  is
disallowed  to  be  queried  in  the  initial  key  extract  query
or  the  time  key  update  query,  respectively.
5)  Guess. The  adversary  A  outputs  its  guess  ˇ′ ∈  {0,  1}  and
wins  this  game  if  ˇ′ =  ˇ.
We  refer  to  such  an  adversary  A  as  an  IND-RID-CCA  adver-
ary.  We  deﬁne  the  adversary  A’s  advantage  in  attacking  the
IBE  as  the  following  function  of  the  security  parameter  k:
dvA(k)  =  |Pr[ˇ′ =  ˇ]  −  1/2|.
eﬁnition  3.  We  say  that  a  RIBE  is  semantically  secure
gainst  an  adaptive  CPA  if,  for  any  polynomial  time  IND-RID-
CA  adversary  A,  the  function  AdvA(k)  is  negligible.
emark  3.  In  the  IND-RID-CPA  and  IND-RID-CCA  games,  an
dversary  A  is  disallowed  to  issue  both  an  initial  key  extract
uery  on  ID*  and  a  time  key  update  query  on  (ID*,  i*)  because
t  is  obvious  that  the  user’s  entire  decryption  key  DID∗i will
e  revealed.  Hence,  it  is  only  allowed  that  the  adversary  A
ay  issue  either  the  initial  key  extract  query  on  ID*  or  the
ime  key  updating  query  on  (ID*,  i*).  If  the  initial  key  extract
uery  on  ID*  is  allowed,  it  simulates  the  ability  of  a  revoked
ser  (an  inside  adversary)  without  the  corresponding  time
ey  update  key  TID∗i for  time  period  i*.  On  the  other  hand,
n  outside  adversary  is  only  allowed  to  obtain  the  time  key
pdate  key  TID∗i for  time  period  i*.  Certainly,  the  adversary
 is  allowed  to  obtain  the  initial  key  and  the  time  key  for
ny  other  ID  and  any  time  period.
ecurity  analysis  (CPA)
seng  and  Tsai  applied  the  work  of  Boneh  and  Franklin,
2001)  to  provide  a tight  security  proof  in  the  random  model
Bellare  and  Rogaway,  1993;  Canetti  et  al.,  2004).  The  fol-
owing  two  theorems  are  given  to  show  that  the  Basic  RIBE
cheme  is  semantically  secure  against  adaptive  CPA  (IND-
ID-CPA)  for  the  outside  adversary  and  the  revoked  user  (or
n  inside  adversary).
heorem  1.  Suppose  that  the  hash  functions  H0,  H1,  and
2 are  random  oracles.  Then  the  basic  RIBE  is  a  semanti-
ally  outsider-secure  IBE  scheme  (IND-O-RID-CPA)  assuming
hat  the  BDH  problem  is  hard  in  groups  generated  by  G.  Con-
retely,  assume  that  there  is  an  outside  adversary  A  that  has
dvantage  ε(k)  against  the  Basic  RIBE  scheme.  Suppose  that
 makes  at  most  qE >  0  initial  key  extraction  queries,  qU >  0
ime  key  updating  queries,  and  qHi >  0  queries  to  hash  func-
ions  Hi (i  =  0,  1,  2).  Then  there  is  an  algorithm  B  that  solves
he  BDH  problem  in  groups  generated  by  G  with  advantage
t  least  AdvG,B(k)  =  2ε(k)/[e(1  +  qE)·qH2],  where  e  is  the  base
f  the  natural  logarithm.
heorem  2.  Suppose  that  the  hash  functions  H0,  H1,  and
2 are  random  oracles.  Then  the  basic  RIBE  is  a  semantically
nsider-secure  IBE  scheme  (IND-I-RID-CPA)  assuming  that  the
DH  problem  is  hard  in  groups  generated  by  G.  Concretely,
ssume  that  there  is  an  outside  adversary  A  that  has  advan-
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makes  at  most  qE >  0  initial  key  extraction  queries,  qU >  0
time  key  updating  queries,  and  qHi >  0  queries  to  hash  func-
tions  Hi (i  =  0,  1,  2).  Then  there  is  an  algorithm  B  that  solves
the  BDH  problem  in  groups  generated  by  G  with  advantage
at  least  AdvG,B(k)  =  2ε(k)/[e(1  +  qU)·qH2],  where  e  is  the  base
of  the  natural  logarithm.
Full RIBE scheme
Fujisaki  and  Okamoto  (1999)  presented  a  simple  conver-
sion  from  a  weak  public-key  encryption  scheme  (IND-CPA)
to  a  strong  public-key  encryption  scheme  (IND-CCA)  in  the
random  oracle  model.  Kitagawa  et  al.  (2006)  proposed  an
improvement  on  Fujisaki  and  Okamoto’s  (1999)  conversion
to  IBE.  They  can  transform  a  weak  IBE  scheme  (IND-ID-CPA)
to  a  strong  IBE  scheme  (IND-ID-CCA).  In  Kitagawa  et  al.’s
conversion,  a  weak  IBE  scheme  (IND-ID-CPA)  must  be  -
uniformity,  where  -uniformity  means  that  the  used  hash
functions  are  random  oracles.  Meanwhile,  the  weak  IBE
scheme  must  be  proved  to  be  semantically  secure  against
an  adaptive  CPA  (IND-RID-CPA).  Meanwhile,  an  extra  hash
function  (also  random  oracle)  must  be  added  to  the  system
to  achieve  strong  IBE  scheme.
Based  on  the  basic  RIBE  scheme  (IND-RID-CPA),  Tseng  and
Tsai  applied  the  transformation  technique  (Kitagawa  et  al.,
2006)  to  construct  the  full  RIBE  scheme  (IND-RID-CCA).  The
full  RIBE  scheme  consists  of  ﬁve  algorithms  that  include  the
system  setup, the  initial  key  extract,  the  time  key  updating,
the  encryption, and  the  decryption  algorithms.
(1)  System  setup. As  in  the  basic  RIBE  scheme.  In  addi-
tion,  the  other  hash  function  H3 :  {0,  1}l ×  {0,  1}n−l ×
{0,  l}∗ →  Z∗q is  needed.
(2)  Initial  key  extract.  As  in  the  basic  RIBE  scheme.
(3)  Time  key  updating.  As  in  the  basic  RIBE  scheme.
(4)  Encryption. In  time  period  i,  given  a  message  m  ∈
{0,  1}l and  a  non-revoked  receiver  with  identity  ID,
a  sender  chooses  a  random  number    ∈  {0,  1}n−l
and  sets  r  =  H3(m,  ,  ID).  Then  the  sender  computes
QIDi =  QID  +  RIDi =  H1(ID)  +  H0(ID,  i)  and  uses  QIDi to  com-
pute  U  =  r·P  and  V  =  (m||)  ⊕  H2(gr),  where  g  =  e(QIDi,
Ppub).  The  ciphertext  for  the  message  is  C  =  (U,  V).
(5)  Decryption. Given  a  ciphertext  C  =  (U,  V),  the  non-
revoked  receiver  with  identity  ID  can  use  his/her  entire
private  key  DIDi to  do  the  following  procedures:
(i)  Computing  V  ⊕  H2(e(DIDi,  U))  =  m′ and  let  [m′]l =  m
and  [m′]n−l =  ,  where  [a]b and  [a]b denote  the  ﬁrst
and  the  last  b  bits  of  a  string  a,  respectively.
(ii)  Testing  that  (H3(m,  ,  ID)·P,  m′ ⊕  H2(gr))  =  (U,
V)  = C.  If  it  does  not  hold,  then  the  receiver  rejects
it.
(iii)  Outputting  mas  the  decryption  of  C.
For  the  general  transformation  from  a  basic  IBE  scheme
with  -uniformity  to  a  full  IBE  scheme,  Kitagawa  et  al.  have
already  given  a  theorem  to  prove  the  security  of  the  full
IBE  scheme  (IND-ID-CCA)  using  the  basic  IBE  scheme  (IND-
ID-CPA).  Here,  we  introduce  their  theorem.  Without  loss  of
generality,  let  1 and  2 be  the  basic  IBE  scheme  and  the
full  IBE  scheme,  respectively.  An  extra  hash  function  is  H  :




heorem  3.  Suppose  that  the  hash  function  H  is  a  ran-
om  oracle  and  ˘1 is  a  -uniform  basic  IBE  scheme.  Let
 be  an  IND-ID-CCA  adversary  that  has  an  advantage  ε(k)
gainst  the  full  IBE  scheme  ˘2.  Suppose  the  challenger  B
akes  at  most  qH >  0  queries  to  hash  function  H,  qE >  0  initial
ey  extraction  queries,  and  qD >  0  decryption  queries.  Then,
here  is  an  IND-ID-CPA  adversary  that  has  advantage  at  least
ε(k)  +  1/2  −  qH/2n−l)·(1  −  qD)  −  1/2  against  the  basic  IBE
cheme  ˘1.
Since  the  hash  functions  used  in  the  basic  RIBE  scheme
re  random  oracles,  it  is  -uniformity  (Fujisaki  and
kamoto,  1999;  Kitagawa  et  al.,  2006).  The  full  RIBE  scheme
s  constructed  from  basic  RIBE  scheme  by  applying  the  gen-
ral  transformation  technique  proposed  by  Kitagawa  et  al.
2006).  Thus,  we  can  enjoy  Theorem  3  to  obtain  two  theo-
ems,  directly.  The  following  two  theorems  state  that  the
ull  RIBE  is  semantically  outsider-secure  (IND-O-RID-CCA)
nd  insider-secure  (IND-I-RID-CCA)  based  on  the  basic  RIBE
cheme.
heorem  4.  Suppose  that  the  hash  function  H3 is  a
andom  oracle.  Let  A  be  an  outsider  adversary  (IND-O-
ID-CCA)  which  has  advantage  ε(k)  against  the  full  RIBE
cheme.  Suppose  the  challenger  B  makes  at  most  qHi >  0
ueries  to  hash  functions  Hi (i  =  0,  1,  2,  3),  qE >  0  initial
ey  extraction  queries,  qU >  0  time  key  updating  queries,
nd  qD >  0  decryption  queries.  Then  there  is  an  outsider
dversary  (IND-O-RID-CPA)  that  has  advantage  at  least
ε(k)  +  1/2  −  qH3/2n−l)·(1  −  qD)  −  1/2  against  the  basic  RIBE
cheme.
heorem  5.  Suppose  that  the  hash  function  H3 is  a  random
racle.  Let  A  be  an  insider  adversary  (IND-I-RID-CCA)  which
as  advantage  ε(k)  against  the  full  RIBE  scheme.  Suppose  the
hallenger  B  makes  at  most  qHi >  0  queries  to  hash  functions
i (i  =  0,  1,  2,  3),  qE >  0  initial  key  extraction  queries,  qU >  0
ime  key  updating  queries,  and  qD >  0  decryption  queries.
hen  there  is  an  outsider  adversary  (IND-I-RID-CPA)  that
as  advantage  at  least  (ε(k)  +  1/2  −  qH3/2n−l)·(1  −  qD)  −  1/2
gainst  the  basic  RIBE  scheme.
onclusion
n  this  paper,  we  have  given  a  brief  review  of  Tseng  and
sai’s  RIBE.  We  have  introduced  the  underlying  mathemat-
cal  problems  and  assumptions,  framework  of  RIBE,  two
oncrete  RIBE  schemes  (basic  RIBE  and  full  RIBE),  sketched
ecurity  analysis  of  two  RIBE  schemes.  For  the  details  of
ecurity  analysis,  readers  can  refer  to  the  full  paper.
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